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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(1) Nature of the case: 
This is an appeal from the Honorable G. Richard Bevin denying, after Court trial, the action 
for declaration of an prescriptive easement and easement by necessity brought by the Plaintiff, 
H.F.L.P., L.L.C. (Hereinafter sometimes referred to as "Harmsen"), against the City of Twin Falls, 
owner of certain property in what is referred to as the "Snake River Canyon", land which borders 
the south side of the snake river west of the main highway bridge leading to Twin Falls City. 
Plaintiff owns property lying to the West of Defendant's property and the subject roadway is the only 
vehicular access to the county road, Plaintiff being bordered by the Snake River on the north, and 
canyon cliffs on the south and west. Testimony established the roadway had been used for over 67 
years and without which road, the Plaintiff is landlocked. 
The subject road is a dirt and gravel road, variously twelve to sixteen feet in width, 
traversing northwesterly and roughly parallel to the Snake River off of Canyon Springs Road, a city 
street, across property now belonging to the City and used as a sewage treatment plant l , (herein 
referred to as the "sewage treatment plant") thence west across a parcel of property which was 
Bureau of Land Management property (herein referred to as the "BLM" property) but which was 
acquired by the City by an Act of Congress just a little over a week before the lawsuit was filed. 
The roadway continues thence further west over several lots and parcels of property, which 
have been variously acquired by the City since 2002, leading to a parcel immediately adjoining a 
creek known as Rock Creek. The property lying east of Rock Creek was previously owned by Idaho 
Foods, Inc., and is referred to herein as the "Sara Lee" property after the business name they sell 
IThis property was City owned since at least the 1960·s. 
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products under. 
There is a bridge made and maintained by Plaintiffs predecessors in interest, and now 
maintained by Plaintiff, across Rock Creek2 which immediately adjoins "parcel 3" of Plaintiffs 
property. Thence, the road continues over parcel three to another parcel west and north of parcel 3 
of City owned property. The road continues over the City property, traversing south westerly to 
another parcel owned by Plaintiff, "parcel 2 " herein. P iaintiff additionally owns yet one more parcel 
even west of parcel 2, which is not at issue in this action. 
Plaintiff originally sought an easement by necessity over the entire roadway, but at trial 
conceded there was no unity oftide with respect to the roadway East of Rock Creek, but did assert 
that theory with respect to the roadway between Plaintiff's parcel 3 and parcel 2 properties, inasmuch 
as the Urie family owned all that property at one time and therefore unity of title did exist on that 
claim.3 
With respect to the roadway east of Rock Creek and leading to Canyon Springs Road, 
Plaintiff maintained a claim of prescriptive easement, inasmuch as it is the only vehicular access to 
the property. In 2010 or 2011, Plaintiff applied for a building permit to Twin Falls County to make 
improvements and repairs to the structures on his property and was de.nied the permit on the basis 
that H.F.L.P., L.L.C., did not have a recorded access easement. Request was made upon the City 
for a written easement, which was refused and this lawsuit was eventually filed as a result. 
(2) Course of Proceedings: 
The Complaint was filed October 27th, 2011, seeking a declaration that (1) Plaintiff is entitled 
2 Rock Creek is a medium sized spring fed creek running north into the Snake River. 
3See Plaintiff's Exhibits 16 A and 16B. 
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to an easement by necessity, or (2) Plaintiff is entitled to an easement by prescription. Defendant, 
City of Twin Falls claimed lack of information and denied any and all claims of the Plaintiff, other 
than jurisdiction and venue, and asserted that Plaintiff had been allowed access across the roadway 
to its property by permission, but did not raise any specific affirmative defenses. 
At Court trial on April 5,2013, Plaintiff presented the testimony of its principal, Stephen M. 
Harmsen, (who was also principal of prior entities owning the property, to wit: Northern Hydro, Inc., 
and West American Finance Corp.,) and the predecessor in interest Carl Urie, who grew up on the 
subject property, as well as the civil engineer (John Root) who surveyed the easement's legal 
description, in support of an easement by prescription. The City presented only the testimony of a 
City Engineer, Lee Gleasemann. 
Plaintiff submitted eY.hibits 1-14, with 7 containing some sub-parts, which were all admitted 
by agreement. While the reporter's transcript refers to these exhibits as a "stack of deeds" actually 
exhibits 1,2,3,4,5 and 6 are maps of the various sections in issue, to wit, sections 19,29,30, and 
32 of Township 9 South Range 17 East, Boise Meridian and Sections 23 and 24 of Range 16 East 
of that same Township. Plaintiff also submitted a 1950's potograph of the developed "Sara Lee" 
property (now also owned by Twin Falls City) and which land immediately adjoins Plaintiffs 
property to the east of Plaintiff' s property (separated by "Rock Creek" over which Plaintiff maintains 
abridge). Plaintiff submitted two maps showing its property and labeled as parcels 1, 2 and 3 
(Exhibits 16A & B) and the survey plat and legal description of the proposed easement (Exhibits 
17 A & B) as well as 4 photographs of Plaintiffs current property and its uses. All of Plaintiff's 
exhibits were admitted without objection. 
Defendant submitted two purported maps (denoted as photographs in the reporter's 
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transcript) which were objected to by Plaintiff on the grounds that they were inadmissible hearsay 
and prepared in anticipation oflitigation (Exhibits B-1 and B-2) which was overruled (Tr. 103-104,). 
At the close of testimony the Court required the parties to submit proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of law, and took the matter under advisement. Ultimately the Court issued its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment against the Plaintiff on June 18. 2013, from 
which this appeal was filed on July 30,2013. 
(3) Statement of the Facts. 
Plaintiff H.F.L.P. L.L.C. is the owner of certain real property Township 9 South, Range 16 
East, B.M., Twin Falls, Idaho, and described as follows: 
Section 22: Lots 8 and 9; Section 23: All of Lots 10 and 14 and that part of Lots 15 
and 17 lying North ofthe South Rim of Snake River Canyon AND the North 50 rods 
of Lot 12, lying West of Rock Creek; Section 14: Lot 15 EXCEPT that part of Lot 
15 lying East of Rock Creek. (Exhibits 7B, 8C, 10; Harmsen testimony Tr. Vol. I,p. 
71, L. 16 to p. 72, L. 5.) 
Originally Steven Harmsen was a principal in Northern Hydo, LLC who acquired the subject 
property in 1992 (Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 7-13), who transferred it to West American Finance, which is 
owned by H.F.L.P., and thence to the H.F.L.P. over which Mr. Harmsen is the controlling 
manager. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 72 L. 13 to p. 73, L.3) Mr. Harmsen further testified he was aware of the 
property and the area since 1985. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 73, L. 12-15) Northern Hydo acquired the above 
described property from Carl Urie and his siblings. (Tr. Vol I, p. 20, L. 6-16, p. 21, L. 3-12; Exhibit 
7D consisting of four deeds and the estate deed.) 
Carl Wayne Urie testified at trial that he was 68 years old, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 19, L. 24), and that 
he moved onto the subject property (Plaintiffs property) when he was 2, or 67 years ago. (Tr. Vol 
I, p. 19, L. 25, p. 20, L. 1-4) His father owned the property at the time (also designated as parcels 1, 
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2 and 3 on Exhibit 16A and 16 B; Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 2-25, p. 25, L. 20-22), and they, the family, 
used the road all the time for vehicle access (Tr. Vol. 1., p. 26, L. 17-19); "it's the only vehicle access 
we had". (Tr. Vol. 1., p. 26, L. 18-19). They not only lived on the property, but had a trout farm from 
1945 to 1955, and then a cattle business up to 1984. (Tr. Vol. 1., p. 27, L. 6-9, p. 30, L. 15-19). In 
addition to using to road for him and his siblings to go to the school bus stop (Tr. Vol 1., p. 28, L. 
21-24, p. 29, L. 17-20), the Vries used the road to take trout to the freight office at least once a week 
and to get both domestic supplies and groceries (Tr. Vol. I, p. 28, L. 24-25, p. 29, L. 1-4) 
From 1955 forward they started in the cattle business, and Carl started working with some 
ofthe neighbors, irrigating and working for Taylor Orchards (now Canyon Springs Golf Course ) (Tr. 
Vol. I p. 30, L. 20-22). The! took any product to sell, as well as domestic uses across the same 
roadway (Tr. Vol. I, p. 31, L. 6-9). Carl's uncles originally homesteaded all that property from the 
sewage plant to 2 miles west or Rock Creek, with a total of four homes, all acquired by Carl's father 
in the 1930's. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 31, L. 20-25) 
In the beginning, the Vries maintained the road up until Sara Lee (a company, not an 
individual) bought some of the property for their sewage treatment plant, after which they pretty 
much maintained the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 32, L. 18-22) Originally it was just a dirt road, and the 
Vries kept the water and brush off of it, but it was pretty rough in places. (Tr. Vol I, p. 32, L. 25, p. 
33, L. 1-4) It was subsequently improved by Sara Lee. (Tr. Vol I, p. 33, L. 6-8) Vries still 
straightened it out in places and put some gravel on it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 9-11) as well as 
maintaining the Canyon Springs grade quite a few times. (Tr. Vol I, p. 33, L. 13-14) The road was 
kept open 12 months of the year. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 33, L. 15-17) Prior to his father, Carl's grandfather 
had a dairy cattle operation in there (the subject property), in the 1920's up through 1945. (Tr. Vol. 
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I, p. 33, L. 18-25, p. 34, L. 1-3). 
After 1976, Carl's brother John lived on the property until 1984, and had about 20 head of 
cattle there. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, L. 16-21) In 1985, Carl moved back on the property and left in 1986 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 34, L. 22-25, p. 35, L. 1-6) According to Carl Urie, the road was traversed and used 
openly, notoriously, continuously, and under a claim of right. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, L. 20-25, 1-7, p. 37, 
L. 8-16) Sometimes people disputed their right to use the road, but they always talked them out of 
it, insisting they, the Uries, had to use it and were allowed to use it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 16-20) In 
about 1960 or 61, they were once stopped by a lock on the gate at the sewer treatment plant, and 
Vries took apart the gate and went on through; later they were stopped by the man who ran the plant 
and after arguing with him a bit, the Vries obtained a key to the gate at the beginning of the sewer 
treatment plant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 16-15, p. 38, L. 1-12) From that date forward they always had 
a key. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 38, L. 13-16) There were a total ofthree gates, one at the east end ofthe sewage 
treatment plant, the west end of the plant and one right at rock creek separating the parties' 
properties (the rock creek one being maintained and controlled by Plaintiff and to which the City, 
or its predecessor, Mr. Cameron, has been given a key) (Tr. Vol. I, p. 40-41; p. 84, L. 11-15); It is 
through the Rock Creek gate the City accesses its property west of Rock Creek (and which property 
divides H.F.L.P. parcels 2 and 3). (Tr. Vol. I, p. 74, L. 25, p. 75, L. 1-16) 
Mr. Urie testified on cross that much ofthe property east of Rock Creek was not farm ground 
or cultivated (Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.8-12) but noted that Mr. Cameron had farmed part of it for pasture 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.50, L.t), that much of it had been mined out earlier (Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.2-3) and that 
there was a dairy, a house and a barn on the property east of Rock Creek. (Tr. Vol. I, p.51, L.20-24; 
See also, p. 44, L. 2-15) In fact, that property east of Rock Creek had a homestead on it, and the barn 
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is still there. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 49, L. 13-19; p. 51, L. 20-24) Other than that, Urie testified it was just 
wild. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 52, L. 5-7) Urie's father sold that property [east of Rock Creek] in 1946. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 44, L. 9-15) In addition, Urie testified that the main property east of Rock Creek was used 
for pasture and had irrigated pasture on it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 59, L. 13-20) 
When Uries owned the premises west of Rock Creek, they grew crops, alfalfa hay, com for 
silage, plus pasture which was consumed by their cattle. (Tr. Vol. I, p.53, L. 7-19) East of Rock 
Creek, there was irrigated pasture, mainly along the river and north of the road. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 59, 
L.13-p.60, L. 15) He further testified there is no viable access to the parcels that were sold to 
Northern Hydro other than a trail up the side of the canyon with some wooden ladders to go up, 
which wasn't used very often because it was dangerous. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 55, L. 3-9) To the west were 
rocks you'd have to climb over and there was no road access to that side of the Urie property. (Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 55, L. 18-23) In addition, there are cliffs all the way along the canyon which prevents 
access on one side. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 56, L. 21-24; p. 57, L. 8-11) and a river on the other side. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 57, L. 11-13) 
The exhibits make it clear that the City of Twin Falls, Idaho acquired its interests in the 
property over which the easement roadway lies as follows: 
(1) To lots 10, 11, and 12 ofT.9, Section 19, Range 17 E, on 01/03/03. (Ex. 9). 
(2) Lots 2, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, and 15E of Rock Creek below the rim and 1,4 below the rim ofT.9, Sec. 
24R. 16E as well as the NE and SEquarters on 01/03/03 (Ex. 10). (H.F.L.P. LLC owns 5.5111 acres 
West of Rock Creek in this Section as well). 
(3)To the SE &, SW quarters, and N below the rim of Snake River in T.9. Section 29, R 17 E on 
o 1/03103 (ex, 11). 
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(4)To Lot 5, Lot 12, in T. 9, Section 23, Range 16E on 6/23/2009 (Ex. 12) (a portion ofthis property 
remains in Rock Creek Joint venture). 
(5) Lots 11, 12, 13, 18 and 19, ofT9, Sec 23, R 16 E on 6123/09 (Ex. 12). 
(6) To lots 5, 6, & 13, T.9, R16 E. Section 24 were acquired from the USA land patent on 
1O/1112011(Ex. 10; Tr. Vol I, p. 108, L. 21 to p. 109, L. 4) (hereinafter the "BLM property") 
Stephen Harmsen testified that he was the business manager ofH.F.L.P. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, 
L. 4-7) and it owns the property in Twin Falls County to which the easement is being claimed as 
appurtenant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, L. 16-22) The subject property was originally purchased in 1992 by 
Northern Hydro, to which Mr. Harmsen was a principal. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 4-7, 25; p. 72, L. 1-3) 
Northern Hydro transferred the property to West American Finance who in tum transferred to 
H.F.L.P. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 9-13) However, Mr. Harmsen had been involved in the area since about 
1985, and since his entities purchased the property, in 1992 he visited it very regularly. He attested 
that the parcels on Exhibit 16A and 16B [labeled as 1,2 and 3] are the three parcels that H.F.L.P. 
owns. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 73, L. 16-25; p. 72, L. 1-2) West of Rock Creek lies parcel 3 which is not 
connected to Parcel 2 and H.F.L.P. seeks an easement of necessity between the two so that the 
property can be tied together. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 75, L. 2-9, p. 76 L. 23-25; p. 77, L. 1-2) Mr. Harmsen 
testified his uses have been that of recreational, camping and attempt at commercial sturgeon raising, 
as well as he runs cattle and other exotic animals on the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 77, L. 13-20) He 
personally uses the road (east) an average of once a month and has employees who use it in the 
summertime weekly and in the wintertime monthly. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 78, L. 3-10) He has family who 
use it on occasion for recreational purposes. Mr. Harmsen presented pictures ofthe old cattle corrals 
and some antique farm equipment (Exhibit 18A) which he took in the last ten years. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
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79, L. 4-20) He also presented a picture (Exhibit l8B) of the motor home that is placed on the 
property and is used for recreational purposes. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 79, L. 21-24) Finally, Mr. Harmsen 
presented Exhibit 18C which is a picture of the hydro electric pump house, which was there when 
H.F.L.P. purchased the property, and is one of the buildings that he desires to fix up, but cannot do 
so without a permit. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 8-24) 
Exhibit 18D is a picture of the hydro electric manifold that's been constructed during 
H.F.L.P.'s ownership, just waiting for it to be attached to a turbine wheel. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 81, L. 2-5) 
Harmsen attested that he couldn't get a building permit because he didn't have a recorded right of 
use [of the access road]. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L. 2-8) Mr. Harmsen had a survey commissioned in 2010 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 82, L. 9-11) but was unable to get the City to agree to a recorded easement. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 82, L. 12-15) Mr. Harmsen acknowledged that he has been given keys to use the gate and had 
keys prior to the City's involvement. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 82, L. 25; p. 82, L. 2) The City became involved 
in portions of the road, the access roadway, in 1998. Prior to that, nobody had disputed H.F .L.P.' s 
right to use it and it was used as the sole access way to the property. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 83, L. 6-11) The 
property is landlocked, totally useless without road access. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 83, L. 16-18) H.F .L.P. owns 
a bridge (Rock Creek) that is maintained, constructed and used by others, including the City, as an 
access for its property that intervenes between parcels 2 and 3 ofH.F.L.~. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 83, L. 19-25; 
p. 84, L. 1-9) 
H.F.L.P. has not denied the City access across the Rock Creek bridge, the same way that 
Harmsen has a key and lock giving him access at the sewage treatment plant. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 84, L. 
11-15) Mr. Harmsen testified that he had traversed the subject easement openly, notoriously, during 
the daylight when people can see, and that the road is visible on the ground. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 85, L. 16-
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24) Anybody who purchased the property or acquired the property would know that there is a road 
that's been used there. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 1-3) In addition to the brid.ge at Rock Creek, there is a 
cattle guard across the road on one part of the roadway access. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 86, L. 3-4) Mr. 
Harmsen has used that road under a claim of right which he didn't think was even disputed until 
recently. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 86, L. S-18) Mr. Harmsen testified that his use impacts the City in that there 
is really only one roadway possible and his right (to use it) doesn't give the City any alternative to 
create a new road. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 87, L. 14-19) This road is not open to the public and only people 
who have property interest are given keys. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 87, L. 20-2S) Mr. Harmsen originally 
acquired his keys from people other than the City in the beginning. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 1-4) At 
various times different people were the keeper of the keys, if you will. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 8-11) As 
Mr. Urie testified, at one point in time there were no locks ... and then locks were put up, and those 
who had property interest we~·e given keys. Presently, the keeper ofthe keys for the sewage treatment 
gate is the City, and the keeper of the keys for the bridge on Rock Creek is H.F.L.P. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
86, L. 11-21) The City has never said that Mr. Harmsen can travel the road and no one has expressly 
given any permission to do so. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 88, L. 22-2S, p. 89, L. I-S) 
Mr. Harmsen intended to build or remodel, or put a deck on, a building in parcel 3. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p. 90, L. 9-12) Originally, there were three homesteads on the H.F.L.P. property, but only one 
remains. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 91, L. II-IS) There is also a bam that's still there. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 91, L. 17-19) 
Ironically, Harmsen was an active participant in the Rock Creek Joint Venture and Shoshone Hydro 
in the late 1980s, prior to buying this particular property. At that time, those entities recognized the 
Uries' easement rights to the road and never prevented Uries from using it. (Tr. Vol. I p, 92, L. 11-
2S, p. 93, L. 9-12) Mr. Harmsen finally testified that his use of the subject property since 1992 has 
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been continuous. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 94, L. 1-3) 
Plaintiff also presented the testimony of John Root, professional land surveyor, who was 
engaged to do the survey on the existing access road. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 62, L. 15-25; p. 63, L. 1-2) He 
attested that the actual width of the road is about 16 feet, although the easement description is 
indicated as a 50-foot wide easement, consistent with other easements recorded in Twin Falls 
County. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 64, L. 9-19) Mr. Root further attested that obviously this road was there and 
had been used (Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, L. 8-11) and that from his knowledge as an engineer in Twin Falls 
County it has been there since 1973. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, L. 16-20) On further examination, he 
acknowledged that the width of the road varies anywhere from 12 to 16 feet. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 68, L. 25, 
p. 69, L. 1-2) 
The City put on the testimony of its engineer, Lee Glaesemann, who has been employed by 
the City since 2002. He testified as to the preparation of Exhibits Bland B2, which were maps that 
he prepared with property lines using auto CAD and overlaid on top of a GIS aerial. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 
102, L. 12-18) The witness admitted that these exhibits were prepared in anticipation oflitigation, 
and Plaintiff objected on the grounds of hearsay. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 104, L. 1-8) Glaesemann 
acknowledged that most of the property east of Rock Creek was purchased in 2002, but that the 
Bureau of Land Management parcel was acquired in 2011 by an act of Congress. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 108, 
L. 15-25, p. 109, L. 1-4) He stated he believed the actual treatment plant itself was purchased or 
received by the City in the early 1960s. Mr. Glaesemann testified that there is a gate at the waste 
water treatment plant, to which he provided a key to Mr. Harmsen, (Tr. Vol. I, p. 112, L. 14-16, 
L.20-23) In fact, there are two gates down by the treatment plant itself, one on the south side that was 
there in 2002, and another on the west side of the property that has been opened and busted up for 
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a number of years. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 113, L. 11-25, p. 114, L. 1-2) He als,? attested to a gate put up in 
2006 that was never completed and a new gate placed at the edge of the City's existing property in 
which they have moved the locks off of the previous gate and used them on the new gate, such that 
it's the same locks and everything, so anybody who has access to the previous gate still has access 
to the new gate. (Tr. Vol I, p. 114, L. 12-25,p. 115, L. 1-7) Mr. Glaesemann acknowledged that Mr. 
Harmsen had a right to use the road and recognized that it was access to his property and that the 
City wasn't going to restrict historical access that he may have had. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 116, L. 19-25, p. 
117, L. 1-6) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
Issue I. Did the Court err in determining H.F.L.P. had not established the statutory time period for 
a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence? 
Issue II. Did the Court below err in concluding that the use of the roadway was not continuous and 
uninterrupted? 
Issue III. Did the Court err in ruling that the Plaintiffs claim of prescriptive easement was not 
adverse and under a claim of right? 
Issue IV. Did the Court err in admitting exhibits B-1 and B-2, the supposed photographic over lays, 
over hearsay objection as they were prepared in anticipation of trial? 
Issue V. Did the Trial Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination, one way or the 
other, over the recently acquired B.L.M. property? 
Issue VI. Did the Trial Court err in failing to find easement by necessity with respect to the H.F .L.P. 
property west of Rock Creek, regarding the road between parcels 3 and 2 of the Plaintiff s property? 
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ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES 
Issue I. The Court erred in determining H.F.L.P. had not established the statutory time period 
for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence. 
This Court specifically noted in Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence,4 153 Idaho 
411,283 P.3d 728 (2012), that "Idaho Code section 5-203 was amended to extend the statutory time 
period from five years to twenty years. However, the twenty year time· period does not apply to an 
easement prescription acquired prior to the amendment." Capstar III, supra at n. 2. In the case at 
bar, the trial court acknowledged that the five year time period applied, but then seemed to apply 
twenty years, anyway, when the Court found there was insufficient evidence of the road being used 
by the Uries from 1986 to 1992. It is true, as the Court noted, that: 
In order to establish an easement by prescription, a claimant must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence use of the subject property that is (1) open and notorious, (2) 
continuous and uninterrupted, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, (4) with actual 
or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement (5) for the statutory 
period. 
Machado v. Ryan, 150 Idaho 212, 280 P.3d 715 (2012). The operative time period in this case 
is prior to 1961, not after it. Plaintiff need not establish each and every element subsequent to the 
ripening of the easement, but only that the easement has been created. Here the trial court stated, 
"[i]t has also failed to prove any authority that a prescriptive easement could trigger many years and 
be recognized by a court now-i.e. the prescriptive easement triggered in 1984 but not adjudicated 
until 2013." 
Plaintiff, in its proposed findings of facts and conclusions oflaw, and in its evidence did not 
focus on 1984 at all. Rather, the focus was upon the Urie testimony which extended from 1945 up 
4This case is sometimes referred to as Capstar III because there had been two prior 
appeals. 
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to 1984. It was during this time that the Vrie family utilized the subject roadway adversely, openly, 
notoriously, continuously, uninterrupted, and under a claim of right for more than five years. 
Plaintiffs case addressed all the uses made by the Vrie family-both domestic and agricultural 
uses-all of which go to the prescriptive easement in question. In fact, by 1961 the Vries' prescriptive 
easement had already matured and ripened into a vested property right, clearly recognized by the City 
when it acquired the sewer plant, and the confrontation took place regarding the gate. 
The Court below seemed troubled, or almost imposing an obligation, that a prescriptive 
easement be adjudicated within some recent time frame or the easement is lost. As was stated in 
Caps tar III, supra, "[t]he law does not compel people to perfect all property rights through litigation. 
In fact, many people acquire property rights through open, notorious and continuous use of property 
for a specified time." Id at 741, [emphasis added]. This is the cornerstone of the trial court's error 
below because the Court took a perspective that the Plaintiff had somehow sat on his rights, or was 
not entitled to recognition of the prescriptive easement, because it had not been, in the trial court's 
mind, timely adjudicated. Of course, the implications from such a legal perspective are monumental. 
The Idaho courts would be flooded with adverse possession and prescriptive easement cases over 
which there was no genuine controversy only to satisfy the 'housekeeping requirement' of the 
judicial, but not legislative imposed, statute oflimitation. 
The law is not so. In this case, by 1961 the rights of the Vries to cross that property, and 
utilize the subject roadway, had already been perfected and were impl~citly recognized by the City 
when it gave keys to Urie. Those rights were subsequently recognized when new owners acquired 
the Urie property, and keys were given to Mr. Harmsen as manager of the various entities he was a 
principal in. 
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This is what the law dictates, for people to recognize vested property interest and to behave 
reasonably. In fact, Harmsen even testified that he thought no one disputed his right to use the 
roadway. It wasn't until other governmental requirements were raised, when Mr. Harmsen requested 
a county building permit, that necessity of a recorded easement ever became an issue. While the City 
in its testimony stated they have never interfered with H.F.L.P.'s use of the property, they have 
nonetheless adamantly refused a written and recorded easement. This is what brought about the 
controversy. 
The City acquired their property after the easement was already vested, and in fact recognized 
that fact, whether it be the sewage treatment plant (1961), the parcels east of Rock Creek (often 
referred to as the Sara Lee property, and acquired variously after 2002), or the recently acquired 
BLM property. 
The focus of the Court's erroneous perception of the significant easement time also tainted 
the Court's perspective on other issues. lithe Court had properly focused on the time period between 
1946 and 1961, it's clear from the testimony that at least the Sara Lee property (now broken up into 
various parcels) lying east of Rock Creek was an occupied parcel of property on which there was a 
homestead, a dairy, a bam, and irrigated pasture operations, all being conducted. The Court would 
have further acknowledged that there was adversity demonstrated, by virtue ofthe testimony, of Carl 
Urie and all the other elements necessary to sustain a prescriptive easement were clearly and 
undisputedly present at that point in time,s and for the prescribed period, i.e. five years. 
5Carl Urie in fact testified regarding that time period that he and his family used the road 
openly, notoriously, continuously, and under a claim of right. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, L. 1-7, 20-25, p. 
37, L. 8-16) Sometimes people disputed their right to use the road, but they always talked them 
out of it, insisting that they had to use it and were aloud to use it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 16-20.) 
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The Court erroneously preferred to focus on the post-1961 events, all of which are after 
Urie's easement rights had matured into a vested property interest. This Court should reverse and 
remand to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff, at least with respect to the roadway east of Rock 
Creek and west of the BLM property.6 
Issue II. The Court below erred in concluding that the use ofthe roadway was not continuous 
and uninterrupted. 
A plaintiff need not prove in a prescriptive easement case that his use of the property 
subsequent to the ripening of a vested property right has been continuous thereafter. In effect, by 
focusing on the time period between 1986 and 1992, the trial court below imposed the twenty year 
prescriptive easement period enacted in 2006 to a pre-2006 easement. Harmsen does not maintain 
that H.F .L.P. acquired an easement right post-1986, he only testified that he continued to use the road 
in question as his sole access to the property. What the Court did, in fact, was either apply a time 
period exceeding five years or somehow ruled that Plaintiff had abandoned the easement. However, 
abandonment was not raised in the pleadings as an affirmative defense. Moreover, there was no 
evidence in the record of any intent to abandon. 7 
6As will be discussed infra the BLM property adjudication is beyond the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the district court because whatever vested rights Vries might have acquire over 
that parcel would have to be determined in a Federal court. As noted by Mr. Glaesemann, 
however, the City has now moved its sewage treatment plant gate to the west side of the BLM 
property, leaving the BLM property open to the general public. As such, there may never be an 
issue as to accessibility over that property. In any event, Harmsen no longer seeks adjudication by 
the Idaho courts of any rights ofH.F.L.P. or its predecessors with respect to the BLM parcel. 
7In Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States of America, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P .3d 502 (2007), 
this court found an easement and a water right sufficiently analogous to treat both as 
appurtenances and held that mere non use was insufficient to constitute abandonment of a water 
right. There must be, in addition thereto, clear and unequivocal evidence of an intent to abandon 
the water right. Citing to Sears v. Berryman, 101 Idaho 843, 623 P.2d 455 (1981). 
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As was testified by Carl Urie, between 1945 and 1986 his family used the road continuously. 
(See Tr. Vol I, p. 34, L. 1 through 37, L. 11-12) This testimony was undisputed anywhere in the 
record. 
In the case at bar, by 1986 Uries' five year prescriptive easement period had long ago 
perfected; in fact, they had already acquired vested rights prior to 1961. The Court below erred in 
focusing on post-1961 events for a determination of the easement, or applying some unplead 
abandonment theory to the present case. Either way, reversal is mandated. 
Issue III. The Court erred in ruling that the PlaintifPs claim of prescriptive easement was not 
adverse and under a claim of right. 
Again, the Court focused on post-1961 events, not pre-1961 events. Carl Urie testified, with 
respect to his family's use of the property, that it was under a claim of right (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 11-
12) and that at times people disputed their right to use the road, but they always insisted they had to 
use it and were allowed to use it. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 37, L. 16-20) He further testified people tried to 
prevent them from using the road a time or two, and then expounded about the incident in 1961 
where Uries tore down the city gate but were eventually given a key. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 38, L. 1-7) The 
Court focused on this event in finding that use of the road was permissive. However, the City was 
simply recognizing at that time the already vested property rights of the Uries, much like Mr. 
Glaesemann who testified with respect to Mr. Harmsen that the City "[r]ecognized that that was an 
access to his property and we weren't going to restrict what historical access that he may have had." 
Inherently, the City admitted that people can have unrecorded, but nonetheless vested, easement 
rights. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 117, L. 3-6) 
The trial court ruled that the lands were wild, u~improved, and unenclosed, and that because 
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the Vries were provided a key to the gate near the waste water treatment plant years ago, there is a 
presumption of permissiveness due to the unimproved nature of the lands, citing to Christie v. Scott, 
110 Idaho 829, 831, 718 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Ct.App. 1989) ( R. at 44) However, Christie is 
distinguishable from the present case. First, ChristIe presented no evidence of how use of the 
disputed road began, focusing only on his own testimony of his use of the road as a subsequent 
purchaser. ChristIe had always had a key since he purchased the property. Much like Harmsen, 
ChristIe testified that he never thought he was in any way trespassing on the property or was acting 
in derogation of anyone's rights. But again, of course, the Court's focus below was on post-1961 
events and not the Vrie use of the road from 1945 to 1961. If you look solely from 1961 forward, 
Christie would appear to be on point. 
However, in this case, unlike Christie, Mr. Harmsen for the Plaintiff herein presented 
testimony of his predecessor-in-interest, who utilized the roadway east from Rock Creek to the 
Canyon Springs road at a time when the non-BLM parcel was owned and occupied by other persons, 
specifically, a dairy farm. Mr. Harmsen did present evidence of the use of the property prior to 
acquiring keys, and moreover, presented specific evidence that the use of the roadway was under a 
claim of right, and adverse, pre-1961. Thus, Plaintiff satisfactorily rebutted any presumption of 
permissive use. 
Moreover, these lands were occupied, other than the BLM parcel, at the time when the 
prescriptive easement rights were established, i.e. 1946 to 1961. An examination of Christie shows 
that the court in that case, after making a visit to the land, found it to be "unimproved, wild and 
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remote". However, in this case the subject property is not remote, it's on the outskirts of a city.8 
Christie cites to West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326 (Idaho 1973), for the proposition that: 
A prescriptive right cannot be obtained ifuse of the servient estate is by permission 
of the owner. Haman, 100 Idaho at 143,594 P.2d at 1096. The general rule is that 
where no evidence is presented to establish how the use began, a presumption arises 
that the use was adverse and under claim of right. West, 95 Idaho at 557,511 P.2d 
at 1333. The owner of the servient estate must then rebut that presumption by 
showing the use was "permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement." 
Id. However, if the lands of the servient estate are wild, unenclosed, or unimproved, 
it is presumed that the use was permissive. West, 95 Idaho at 557 n. 32, 511 P .2d at 
1333 n. 32. West, supra, at 1269. 
West, in turn, cites to Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wn.2d 75,123 P.2d 
771 (Wash. 1942). That case explains the principle behind the rule as follows: 
However, proof that the use by one of another's land has been open, notorious, 
continuous, uninterrupted, and for the required time creates a presumption that the 
use was adverse, unless otherwise explaineu, and, in that situation, in order to 
prevent another's acquisition ofan easement by prescription, the burden is upon the 
owner of the servient estate to rebut the presumption by showing that the use was 
permissive. Wendler v. Woodard, 93 Wash. 684, 161 P. 1043; 2 Thompson, Real 
Property, Perm.Ed 1939,95, § 512; 4 Tiffany, Real Property, 3d Ed. 1939,563, § 
1196a; 17 Am.Jur. 981, Easements, § 72; 28 C.J.S. 736 Easements, § 68, Accord: 
Lechman v. Mills, 46 Wash. 624" 91 P. 11, 13 L.R.A., N.S., 990, 13 Ann.Cas. 923; 
Berryman v. East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co., supra; Ochfen v. Kominsky, 121 
Wash. 60,207 P. 1050. Cr., Long v. Leonard, supra. 
This last mentioned rule does not apply, however, to vacant, open, 
unenclosed, unimproved lands. In such cases, mere use of a way over the land of 
another, in the manner and for the time referred to in the last preceding rule, will not 
of itself give rise to a presumption that the use has been adverse, or as sometimes 
expressed to a presumption of a grant. Courts do not, in such cases, infer adverse user 
but require evidence of fact or circumstances indicating that the user was indeed 
adverse and not permissive. (Citations omitted) 
Thus, in Watson v. Board of Commissioners of Adams County, supra [38 
Wash. 662, 80 P.202] this court said: 'While we do not now hold that a right of way 
8If not actually within the city limits, the subject roadway would certainly be within its 
area of impact for zoning purposes. 
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by prescription cannot be acquired over wild, unoccupied, prairie lands, we do hold 
that, in order to give a prescriptive right, the use must be such as to convey to the 
absent owner reasonable notice that a claim is made in hostility to his title. It seems 
to us that any other rule amounts to a practical confiscation of private property for 
public purposes.' (Italics ours.) 
The books reveal many cases wherein, under particular sets of facts, private 
easements over the lands of others have been acquired by prescription, at a time when 
such lands were open and unenclosed. While there has been a wide divergence of 
opinion upon the subject, the prevailing view, and the principle which we now adopt, 
is that such prescriptive rights may be obtained when the facts and circumstances are 
such to show that the user was adverse and hostile to the rights of the owner, or that 
the owner has indicated by some act his admission that the claimant has a right of 
easement. (Citations omitted) 
An adverse user will not ripen into a prescriptive right unless the owner of the 
servient estate knows of, and acquiesces in, such user, or unless the user is so open, 
notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence on his part 
will be presumed.9 Northwest Cities Gas, supra, at 85-88. 
When we properly understand the principle behind the rule, and apply that to the facts ofthis 
case, a different result is mandated. At the time the easement was created in the early 1950s, the 
property was occupied (other than the BLM) and, in fact, according to Urie's testimony, at times 
people protested the use. Moreover, the Court below specifically found, "[i]t is no secret that 
H.F.L.P. and for that matter, its predecessors use and/or used the road'to access its property. Such 
facts also indicate that the City of Twin Falls and its predecessors have actual knowledge ofH.F.L.P. 
and its predecessors' use of the road. Even ifthey did not have actual knowledge, they would have 
imputed knowledge, as the road is quite apparent across the property now owned by the City of Twin 
Falls." ( R., p. 42-43) 
Much like the children's game of "Gossip", where one child whispers a phrase in the ear of 
9Citing to Downie v. Renton, 162 Wash. 181,298, P. 454 (1931). 
APPLELLANTS OPENING BRIEF Page -20-
another, who in turn whispers the next child, and on and on, until last child blurts out what he or she 
understands what the phrase was and it is compared to the original phrase, often with humorous 
results, sometimes in the law, as one court cites to another court, and on and on, some of the meaning 
or principle behind a rule can be lost in translation. While H.F.L.P. believes that actual adversity was 
proven in this case, this Supreme Court should elucidate further upon the rule of wild and 
unimproved lands to make it clear to subsequent courts the purpose behind the rule, because in this 
case, the ruling of the trial court that adversity cannot be presumed is completely and wholly 
incongruent with the ruling of the trial court that the owners of the property knew or should have 
known of the use. 10 
The purpose ofthe "wild and unenclosed" exception simply does not apply here where, when 
correctly analyzed at the proper time, i.e. 1946 to 1961, when the property was occupied. Moreover, 
portions of the subject property were improved, as Urie pointed out, where the irrigated pasture, barn 
and homestead were. 11 The fact that the borders of the actual roadway were not also improved does 
not, in and of itself, obviate the presumption of adversity. Obviously, anyone originating a roadway 
lOIn fact, it may be the day to recognize that the exception is simply no longer applicable 
at all. The days of cattle drives across the open range to foreign markets are long ago gone. 
Property owners today have much more access to observe the condition of their estate. Google 
Earth, for example, allows anyone, no matter how far from their primary residence, to zoom in 
upon the contour of their property and observe roadways, fence lines, or other regular activity 
taking place on their property. Accordingly, it would be a rare case where someone had property 
so remote and so isolated that they did not, with due care, know of the adverse uses taking place 
on their property. The wild and unenclosed exception to the presumption of adversity has over-
lived its usefulness and is a pure fiction in modern society. Plaintiff re.quests it be abandoned in 
its entirety or significantly restricted to situations where the property is indeed remote, isolated 
and unobservable by the servient tenant. 
lIThe trial court observed where Mr. Urie pointed to on the exhibits, that same ones 
Plaintiff objects to herein. 
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would not commence or construct such road over the actual crop land or homestead of the servient 
tenant. The dominant tenant would go around the lands in actual productive use, and that has been 
so for hundreds of years, when it was horses and now cars. 
There is no question here but what the servient tenant then knew of the prescriptive use and 
it was adverse to their interest. Subsequent owners have recognized this fact from the time they 
acquired the property, honoring Plaintiff s historical easement rights up until the point when county 
rules and regulations mandate a recorded easement. Then and only then do the current owners now 
protest. It was the Defendant or actually its predecessors-in-interest, who sat on their rights to eject 
Urie's use of the roadway. The five year period of continuous use having been established by not 
only clear and convincing evidence, but undisputed evidence in this case, Urie's easement vested. 
Issue IV. The Court erred in admitting exhibits B-1 and B-2, the supposed photographic over 
lays, as they were prepared in anticipation oftrial, and were accordingly inadmissible hearsay. 
The trial court admitted into evidence two photographic "over lays" which were admittedly 
prepared in anticipation of this litigation. Defendant objected as hearsay, and that the exhibits would 
not qualify as either a business record or public record exception under such circumstances, and the 
court simply overruled the objection. (Tr.103-104) There is no doubt but what the documents, be 
they maps or photographs, or whatever, are an out of court statement, purporting to be for the truth 
of the matter asserted therein. They were prepared by the witness with this trial in mind, not as a part 
of any regular business conducted activity or public record exception to the hearsay rule. 
In Hurtado v. Land o 'Lakes, Inc., 147 Idaho 813,215 P.2d 533 (2009) this Court stated: 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 802 states: "Hearsay is not admissible except as 
provided by these rules or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court ofIdaho." 
However, "[t]he trial court has based discretion whether to admit hearsay under one 
of the exceptions, and [the Court] will not overturn the exercise of that discretion 
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absent a clear showing of abuse." State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 937, 188 P.3d 867, 
879, (2008). When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, this Court 
inquires: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and 
consistently with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason. !d. 
One exception to the hearsay rule under which the court may admit evidence 
is LR.E. 803(6): 
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the 
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, 
report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the -testimony of 
the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification and 
complies with Rule 902 (11), unless the source of information or the 
method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
The general requirements for the admission of business records are that the 
documents be "produced in the ordinary course of business, at or near the time of 
occurrence and not in anticipation of trial." Baco Corp. V. Roberts & Sons Constr. 
Co., 114 Idaho 704, 711, 760 P.2d 1120, 1127 (1988). These foundational 
requirements supply the degree of trustworthiness necessary to justify an exception 
to the rule against hearsay." Id. It is necessary that the circumstances behind the 
creation of the business records "impl[y] a high degree of veracity." Christensen v. 
Rice, 114 Idaho 929, 934, 763 P.2d 302, 207 (Ct.App. 1986). 
See also, Heston v. Payne, 97 Idaho 193,541 P.2d617 (1975) (fraudulent representation that 
record was prepared at the time the 2-4-D chemical was applied, when in fact the record was 
prepared in anticipation of trial, mandated setting aside jury verdict and requiring new triaL); cf City 
of Idaho Falls v. Beco Canst. Co., Inc., 123 Idaho 516,850 P.2d 165 (1993) (where proffered exhibit 
constituted a summary, the key issue is whether such printout is prepared of anticipation oflitigation, 
citing to U.S. v. Shyres, 898 F. 2d 647,657, n. 5 (8th Cir. 1990). 
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Moreover, for the same reason, neither can the City rely upon subsection (8) of LR.E. rule 
803, which provides: 
Public records and reports. Unless the sources of information or other 
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthines&, records, reports, statements, or data 
compilations in any form of a public office or agency settin.g forth its regularly 
conducted and reguldrly recorded activities, or matters observed pursuant to duty 
imposed by law and as to which there was a duty to report, or factual findings 
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law. The 
following are not within this exception to the hearsay rul: (A) investigative reports 
by police and other law enforcement personnel, except when offered by an accused 
in a criminal case; (B) investigative reports prepared by or for a government, a public 
office or an agency when offered by it in a case in which it is a party; ( C) factual 
findings offered by the government in criminal cases; (D) factual findings resulting 
from special investigation of a particular complaint, case, or incident, except when 
offered by an accused in a criminal case. 
Much like photo-shopping, one can make the picture/overlay show as little or as much as one 
likes, in this case zooming out to render the improved quality of, or improvements upon the land, 
visible, or if desired to not make those improvements not visible, in the Exhibits B-1 and B-2. 
Moreover, we have no measure of accuracy as to where Glaesemann chose to delineate the 
lines, vis-a-vis the natural contour ofthe land. That doesn't necessarily imply some evil intent, just 
that it's not a document routinely and ordinarily prepared for some legitimate business or public 
record-keeping purpose. The inherent bias in preparing a document as an exhibit for trial has long 
been recognized by the courts as a fatal flaw to admitting the document under either hearsay 
exception, or even as a summary. Preparation of a document in anticipation oflitigation permanently 
taints its admissibility, and this Court should find clear error in this regard. 
Issue V. The Trial Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to make a determination, one way 
or the other, over the recently acquired B.L.M. property. 
After trial, in its proposed findings and conclusions, H.F.L.P. argued to the Court that the 
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Idaho court could make no adjudication with respect to the easement rights over the BLM property, 
because any such adjudication would necessarily infringe upon exclusive subject matter jurisdiction 
vested in the Federal courts because the land had been BLM property up until 2011. 
28 U.S.C Section.1346(f) provides that, "The district court [meaning the United States 
District Court] shall have exclusive original jurisdiction of civil actions under 2409a to quiet title 
to an estate, or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed by the United States. 
Inasmuch as any prescriptive easement for which Plaintiff sought a declaration of easement 
was prior to the acquisition by the city of the lots in section 29 and 30, this Court would lack 
jurisdiction to make any determination ofH.F.L.P., L.L.C., vis-a-vis the United States government. 
While ordinarily failure to raise a lack of jurisdiction is waived if not raised in the pleadings, 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 
P.3d 731 (Idaho Ct. App. 2008); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781,1785, 
152 L.Ed. 2d 860, 866 (2002) (The court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived by 
a party). 
In fact, a party may assert lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the first time on appeal. 
Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Turner, 130 Idaho 190, 191,938 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1997). The issue may 
even be raised sua sponte by a trial or appellate court. State v. Kagajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483,80 P.3d 
1083, 1084 (2003). 
Even if this Court <letermines subject matter jurisdiction was proper, the issue of any 
easement over the BLM property has become moot by virtue of the City having moved its gate to 
the west end of the BLM property, thereby effectively opening that land to the general public. 
H.F.L.P. made it clear in its closing documents that it was no longer seeking any adjudication with 
respect to the BLM property; The City having filed no counterclaim for adjudication itself, the Trial 
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Court erred in even ruling on the matter insofar as the BLM property is concerned. 12 
Issue VI. The Trial Court erred in failing to find easement by necessity with respect to the 
H.F.L.P. property west of Rock Creek, regarding the road between parcels 3 and 2 of the 
Plaintiff's property. 
The trial court ruled that Plaintiff satisfied the necessity of the easement, at the time of 
severance, and the great present necessity of the easement, but that H.F .L.P. failed to prove that there 
ever existed a unity of title. This, however, flies in the face of Carl Urie's testimony that "[m]y dad 
and three, three of my uncles originally homesteaded all that property from the city sewage treatment 
plant to two miles west of Rock Creek and there were four homes, homesteads all together, and my 
father acquired all four of them sometime in the 1930's." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 31, L. 20-25) He further 
attested that the property east of the Rock Creek bridge was sold in 1946. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 43, L. 21-25, 
p. 44, L. 1-4) This fact was never even disputed at trial. While ordinarily a trial court's findings will 
not be set aside if they are supported by substantial and competent evidence on the record, State ex 
rei. Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140, 144,594 P.2d 1093, 1097 (1979), there is no evidence to refute 
Urie's assertion of unity oftitle. In fact, it simply wasn't an issue in the underlying case. No one 
disputed that the Urie's father owned all the property west of the Rock Creek bridge. East of the 
Rock Creek bridge, it does appear that there was not complete unity of title, and Mr. Harmsen 
conceded same at trial. The Court erred in not finding easement by necessity with respect to the 
roadway between parcels 2 and 3, a matter not really even at issue. 
12Ironically, by not filing any counterclaim, the City may well be foreclosed as to any 
prescriptive easement rights it might claim over and across the bridge at Rock Creek and across 
Plaintiff's parcel 3 to reach its property west of Rock Creek. See, LR.C.P. Rule 13A. The failure 
to plead a claim properly classified as a compulsory counter claim bars any subsequent action on 
the claim, and while this cor.sequence is consistent with general principles of res judicata, 
subsequent actions on claims properly classified as compulsory under this rule are barred simply 
by the operation of the rule itself. Blazer v. Camron, 116 Idaho 453, 776 P.2d 462 (Ct.App.1989) 
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CONCLUSION 
F or the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and the matter 
remanded back to the Trial Court with instructions to enter an easement along the disputed roadway 
from the BLM property east to Rock Creek. In this regard, the Trial Court would have to consider 
the uses and limitations of the prescriptive easement, because the Court made no findings in this 
regard. 
With respect to the BLM property, the judgment of the Trial Court should be vacated on the 
grounds that there is no jurisdiction for an Idaho trial court to consider easement interests over 
property which were then owned by the United States; alternatively, that any ruling regarding the 
BLM property has become moot in any event. 
Finally, the Court should be required to enter an easement by necessity in favor of H.F .L.P. 
and across the City of Twin Falls property between Plaintiffs parcel nos. 2 and 3. Plaintiff should 
have and recover its costs herein. Plaintiff is not seeking attorney's fees on appeal. 
DATED THIS day of February, 2014. 
-
STEVEN A. WUTHRICH 
Attorney for Appellant H.F.L.P. 
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